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Abstract
This paper examines the uncovered interest parity (or forward premium) puzzle in four
Central and Eastern European countries – Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania – as well
as their aggregates from 1999 to 2019. Because the interest parity is a foundation of open-
macroeconomy analyses, with important implications for policymaking, especially central
banking, more systematic evidence on interest parities in the CEE economies is needed. In
this study, we not only address this need but also add to a broader discussion on the UIP
puzzle after the global financial crisis. The UIP is verified vis-à-vis three major currencies:
the euro, the U.S. dollar, and the Swiss franc. We start by providing a full set of baseline
forward premium regressions for which we examine possible structural breaks and perform
a decomposition of deviations from the UIP. Next, we explore augmented UIP models and
introduce various factors which potentially account for the UIP puzzle, such as the realized
volatility of the exchange rate, a volatility model of the excess returns, and international
risk and business cycle measures. The study shows that the choice of the reference currency
matters for the outcome of the interest parity tests in the CEE economies. The puzzle
prevails for the EUR and the CHF but not for the USD, a regularity that has not been
documented in previous studies. Second, we find that structural breaks in the time series
used to test the UIP are not an essential reason for the general failure of the parity in the
region. Third, we demonstrate that even though the risk-based measures largely improve the
baseline testing regression, both from statistical and economic points of view, they do not
alter the overall outcomes of our empirical models. Additionally, we show that the exchange
rate peg of the Czech koruna to the euro from 2013 to 2017 had a significant impact on the
UIP. A detailed case study on Poland, using granular survey data, indicates that the directly
measured exchange rate expectations do not seem to be informed by the UIP relationship.
Employing data on option-implied risk reversals, we reveal that the limited resilience of CEE
economies to rare disasters may plausibly explain deviations from the UIP.
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Central and Eastern Europe.
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1 Introduction
Why do high-interest rate currencies appreciate, rather than depreciate, as implied by the uncov-
ered interest parity (UIP)? Given their stark consequences for international financial integration,
central banking, and exchange rate management, as well as practical implications for cross-border
investment, anomalies in the UIP have raised various controversies. Considerable progress in this5
area, both on empirical and theoretical fronts, has not yet led to the consensus on how prevalent
or robust is the UIP (or forward premium) puzzle and which mechanisms explain its existence
(see Engel, 2016). Specifically, the recent findings in this area highlight two issues concerning
the puzzle. First, the empirical results on the violation of the UIP seem to differ across countries
and currencies: between advanced and emerging economies or various exchange rate systems10
(Frankel and Poonawala, 2010; Engel and Zhu, 2019). Second, some studies indicate that the
global financial crisis (GFC), the subsequent zero lower bound environment and unconventional
monetary policies implemented by the major central banks may have brought lasting distortions
in the interest rate parities (Bussiere et al., 2018; Ismailov and Rossi, 2018). In this paper, we
take up both of these threads and study the group of Central and Eastern European (CEE)15
economies, an appealing example of small open economies, financially integrated with the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union but retaining, for the most part, independent monetary policies and
floating exchange rate regimes.
The paper re-examines the evidence on the presence of the UIP puzzle for four CEE countries
– Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania – as well as their aggregates from 1999 to 2019. Even20
though there is some research on these countries (see, e.g., Jiang et al., 2013), it is still relatively
scarce, especially in comparison with abundant literature on advanced economies. Thus, not only
do we review the related literature on the UIP puzzle in both advanced and CEE economies,
but we also provide new and up-to-date evidence for the latter group using insights from the
literature on the former group. The relationship is investigated vis-à-vis three major currencies:25
the euro, the U.S. dollar, and the Swiss franc, for 1-month money market interest rates. We start
by providing a full set of baseline forward premium regressions for which we examine possible
structural breaks and perform a decomposition of deviations from the UIP. We further explore the
augmented UIP models and introduce several model specifications that include various factors
which potentially account for the UIP puzzle, such as the realized volatility of the exchange rate,30
a volatility model of excess returns, and international risk and business cycle measures.
We arrive at several noteworthy findings. First, we show that the choice of the reference
currency matters for the outcome of the interest parity tests in the CEE economies. The puzzle
prevails for the EUR and the CHF but not for the USD, a regularity that has not been docu-
mented in previous studies. Second, we find that the structural breaks in the time series used35
to test the UIP are not an essential reason for the general failure of the parity in the region.
Third, we demonstrate that even though the risk-based measures largely improve the baseline
testing regression, both from statistical and economic points of view, they do not alter the over-
all outcomes of our empirical models. We also show that the exchange rate peg of the Czech
koruna to the euro from 2013 to 2017 had a significant impact on the UIP. A detailed case study40
on Poland confirms that forecast and risk premium errors play leading roles in UIP deviations,
although their relative contributions may differ given the foreign currency used in the tests.
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Option-implied risk reversals for the CEE currencies and the euro indicate that crash risks are
priced into their exchange rates.
The principal contribution of this paper comes from a comparative analysis of the CEE45
economies, which we scrutinize under competing specifications of regression models. Impor-
tantly, given that the sample encompasses the turmoil times of the GFC, it is long enough to
mitigate the so-called peso problem and the results, therefore, are not subject to a small sample
bias. Moreover, CEE economies fit well ‘a risky country’ profile in the rare disaster hypothesis
developed by Farhi and Gabaix (2016). We demonstrate how their hypothesis can be used empir-50
ically to explain the deviations from the UIP relationship in CEE economies. We also contribute
to the literature in two other respects. First, building on the insights into a decomposition of the
UIP regression slope coefficient from Bussiere et al. (2018), we put forward a simple way to carry
out such a decomposition when constrained by the lack of data on exchange rate expectations.
Such data are seldom available for emerging market economies, including CEE countries, over55
long periods (see, e.g., Cuestas et al., 2015). Second, as an extension to the main part of the
study, we provide a country-specific insight using the datasets that have not been used in empir-
ical studies on the forward premium puzzle: foreign exchange (FX) market interventions by the
Czech National Bank, survey-based forecasts of the Polish zloty exchange rate by financial ana-
lysts, and risk reversals for CEE currencies. These datasets enable us to demonstrate that: (1)60
the UIP relationship can break down in the presence of FX market interventions, (2) the directly
measured exchange rate expectations do not seem to be informed by the UIP relationship, and
(3) the limited resilience of CEE economies to world disasters may plausibly explain deviations
from the UIP.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews recent studies on the UIP puzzle.65
In sections 3 and 4, we lay down a theoretical framework for the paper and describe the empirical
models and data. Section 5 contains the empirical results, along with the discussion of our main
findings. We then turn to additional case studies on Czechia, Poland, and rare disasters (section
6). The final section concludes and outlines further research in the area.
2 Related literature70
There is a long research tradition of the UIP relationship in advanced economies, especially
for the U.S. dollar. Many empirical studies find little support for the UIP, revealing that higher
interest rate currencies often appreciate against lower interest rate ones, the phenomenon dubbed
the UIP puzzle or the Fama (1984) puzzle.
The main empirical findings in this literature can be summarised in several important ob-75
servations. First, the UIP works better in emerging market economies (EMEs) compared to
advanced economies (AEs) (see, e.g., Bansal and Dahlquist, 2000; Frankel and Poonawala, 2010;
Gilmore and Hayashi, 2011). In an important study, Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) define the
puzzle as a case in which the observed direction of an exchange rate change is opposite to the
one implied by the UIP. In other words, deviations from the UIP that do not violate the direc-80
tion of the implied relationship between the exchange rate and interest rates are not considered
the puzzle. Using this terminology, they document that the UIP is rejected in both groups of
economies, but the puzzle is not a pervasive phenomenon: it is not present in EMEs. They
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put forward a conjecture that there is a relationship between the level of development, average
inflation, inflation volatility, and the presence of the UIP puzzle.85
In more recent studies, these findings are corroborated. Frankel and Poonawala (2010) hy-
pothesize that EMEs’ currencies have more easily identified trends of depreciation than currencies
of AEs. This does not remove the bias in the forward discount as a predictor of the future change
in the spot exchange rate, but the bias is less severe among the former currencies than the latter.
Given this finding and the observation that EMEs’ currencies are probably riskier, it is suggested90
that a time-varying exchange risk premium may not be a proper explanation of the UIP puzzle.
In line with the previous studies Gilmore and Hayashi (2011) establish that the extent of the
puzzle is smaller for EMEs than for AEs. Interestingly, using aggregate data for both groups of
economies, they observe that the excess return on emerging market currencies is better explained
by the interest rate differential for major currencies than by the interest rate differential between95
emerging market currencies. They conjecture that the excess return for individual currencies has
a common global real interest factor and the interest rate differential between AEs is a better
predictor of this factor.
The second key finding on the UIP condition is that it works systematically better in crisis
times when both the exchange rate and interest rate volatilities are high (see, e.g., Flood and100
Rose, 2002; Clarida et al., 2009; Czech, 2017). Using the data that include the major currency
crises in the 1990s, Flood and Rose (2002) report that the high interest rate currencies tend to
depreciate, although the exchange rate changes are short of those implied by the interest rate
differential. In this sense, the UIP ‘works better than it used to’. The likely reason behind this
improvement is that the increased exchange rate and interest rate volatilities raise ‘the stakes105
for financial markets and central banks’ and ‘may provide a more statistically powerful test for
the UIP hypothesis’ (Flood and Rose, 2002).
A violation of the UIP obtained in Fama regressions is an artefact of the volatility regime
according to Clarida et al. (2009). In line with the massive literature, they document that the
high interest rate currency tends to appreciate but show that this finding holds in low volatility110
environments only. In high volatility states, it is the low interest rate currency that appreciates,
and the change is greater than the one implied by the UIP. This is in line with the finding that
as volatility grows, the available speculator capital shrinks due to higher margins and capital
requirements, so traders cut back on their carry trade activities (Brunnermeier et al., 2008).
Interestingly, using a similar explanation Ismailov and Rossi (2018) argue that deviations from115
the UIP are more likely in highly uncertain environments because investors might not be willing
to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities.
Third, some papers find that the UIP holds more often in the long run than in the short
run (see, e.g., Juselius, 1995; Chinn and Meredith, 2004; Lothian and Wu, 2011; Chinn and
Quayyum, 2012). Using ultra long time series on two currency pairs, the French franc versus120
the pound sterling and the U.S. dollar versus sterling that span the 1800-1999 Lothian and Wu
(2011) demonstrate that the UIP holds over the very long haul, and the puzzle emerges only when
the 1980s dominate the sample. Their conjecture is that the deviations from the UIP, including
deviations over long spans of time, are due to slow adjustment of expectations to actual regime
shifts as well as anticipations for extended periods of regime shifts that never materialize. Thus,125
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their explanation is related to the well-known peso problem.
The joint hypothesis of UIP and rational expectations is found to hold better at long horizons
than at short ones by Chinn and Meredith (2004). This is in line with the point raised by
Juselius (1995) that over the long run, the exchange rate and interest rates cannot diverge
substantially without evoking adjustment forces that tend to restore equilibrium. The findings130
are corroborated by Chinn and Quayyum (2012) who additionally observe that the effect is
somewhat weaker in a sample that includes the close to zero lower bound interest rates in Japan
and Switzerland. At the same time, they admit that the failure of the UIP is more pronounced
at long horizons when the pound sterling instead of the U.S. dollar is used as the base currency.
Empirical studies on the UIP puzzle in CEE countries often reflect broader themes present135
in macroeconomic research on these economies.1 Primarily, the UIP is revoked when discussing
the unique situation of the CEE economies being the EU members outside of the Eurozone, the
effectiveness of their independent monetary policies, and costs and benefits of the future euro
adoption in these countries. Against this backdrop, Filipozzi and Staehr (2012) estimate the UIP
regressions for the CEE economies and the euro using data ranging from 1999 to 2011. Their140
results show that the UIP holds for Romania, there is a forward premium puzzle for Czechia and
Hungary, and the outcomes for Poland are not conclusive. The study also demonstrates that
low and high interest rate spread regimes and global risk factors may explain some shifts in risk
premia in CEE economies, although their role is not uniform across countries.
Using slightly longer time-series, Cuestas et al. (2017) estimate a similar set of models but145
consider possible structural breaks in the regressions. They show that the UIP hypothesis can-
not be rejected when the empirical models assume rational expectations of the exchange rate.
Since this is a standard way of testing for the UIP, the results stand at odds with the majority
of international empirical studies. However, when regression specifications incorporate static
expectations (i.e., naive, based just on the observable exchange rate), there is more substantial150
evidence for the UIP anomaly in all CEE economies. It is therefore argued that the way that
expectations are formed by FX market participants is crucial in interpreting the results of the
UIP tests in Central Europe.
In a recent study, Ferreira and Kristoufek (2020) investigate the UIP condition for the entire
EU using the so-called fractal analysis, based on the cross-correlations of daily financial data.155
They report that, as a rule, the UIP is less likely to hold for the non-Euro economies, but there
is considerable evidence against investors’ risk-neutrality and rational expectations in all EU
economies. The results for the group of CEE economies are mixed, with some indication of
the UIP puzzle for Hungary, Poland, and Romania. This result is attributed to the monetary
autonomy of these economies and the systematic reactions of their central banks to asymmetric160
shocks.
The literature also links the tests for interest parity to the long-lasting effects of economic
transformation, financial liberalization, differences in income levels between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU
members, and a relatively fast catching-up process of the region. An example of such an analysis
was provided by Jiang et al. (2013) who test for stationarity in the FX risk premium components165
among the CEE economies. The study uses of the money market interest rates from 1997 to
1Long-run relationships in the CEE real exchange rates are studied by, e.g., Kȩbłowski (2011).
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2011 and estimates a set of threshold autoregressive models. It finds that the long-run UIP holds
for all four CEE countries included in our study and the euro as a base currency. However, little
is said about possible short-term deviations from the parity.
An important theme in the UIP research on CEE economies is the role of exchange rate170
volatility and related country-specific risks in explaining forward premium anomalies. Horobet
et al. (2010) perform the UIP tests augmented with the capital market and FX market volatility
vis-à-vis four developed market currencies. They demonstrate that the UIP anomalies for the
comparatively high-yielding CEE currencies may be related to the role that market volatility
plays in asymmetric adjustments in exchange rates, particularly during episodes of swift depre-175
ciation followed by periods of sluggish appreciation. Using threshold and component GARCH
models, Triandafil and Richter (2012) generally reject the UIP for the CEE economies, both
when the euro and U.S. dollar are taken as a reference currency. They explain these results with
relatively high inflation rates specific to transition economies that translate to an elevated risk
aversion in CEE financial markets.180
The UIP puzzle in CEE economies is also studied through the lens of carry trade opportunities
in their FX markets. Hoffmann (2012) shows that strong economic growth and relatively high
yields have attracted substantial un-hedged portfolio investment flows to the region. He finds
that the UIP is typically violated in CEE countries between 1999 and 2009 when the euro or the
Swiss franc are used as funding currencies. The returns to carry trade tend to be higher when185
a CEE economy retains a managed floating or fixed exchange rate regime. They also depend
on the global risk factors and increase when the interest rate spread against the Eurozone or
Switzerland are sizeable.
Covering a broader sample of post-transition economies, Hayward and Hölscher (2014) con-
firm that over the period 2000-2011, the average carry trade returns in the region differ between190
the two regimes, which they describe as ‘moderation’ and ‘crisis’. The latter is associated mainly
with the GFC: abrupt unwinding of cross-border investment, followed by low mean returns. They
demonstrate that abnormal returns on CEE currencies were easier to obtain in the 2000s when
the U.S. dollar was the funding currency, while the results for the euro were mixed. For all four
economies studied in this paper, carry trades funded by the Swiss franc also turned out to be195
profitable.
3 Theoretical background
In this section, we first explain the UIP relationship and then discuss three insights on deviations
from that relationship that have testable implications. A central building block of our theoretical
framework is the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) relationship. This condition says that the200
differences between domestic and foreign interest rates are compensated for by the expected
changes in the exchange rate. In other words, the expected excess return on any currency is zero
unless there exist barriers that hinder capital flows between countries.
Let the nominal exchange rate St be defined as the price of domestic currency in terms of
foreign currency, so its increase reflects an appreciation of domestic currency. In line with a small205
open economy assumption, the foreign currency is assumed to be one of the major currencies,
e.g., the U.S. dollar. The risk-free rates of return on domestic and foreign assets are it and
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i∗t , respectively. In order to make them comparable, the former is expressed as a dollar rate of
return, i.e., it + s
e




t+1 and st = lnSt. The UIP condition is given by:
set+1 − st + it − i
∗
t = 0. (1)
Under rational expectations Set+1 = EtSt+1, so the log rate of expected appreciation of210
domestic currency is ln(EtSt+1) − lnSt. Following the literature (see, e.g., Engel, 1996), it is
assumed that the exchange rate is conditionally log-normally distributed, so the UIP can be
restated as:
Etst+1 − st + it − i
∗
t = −0.5vart(st+1) (2)
where the term on the right hand side is the conditional variance of the log of the exchange rate.
Given that there are no systematic errors (expectations are rational), the UIP becomes:215
ρt+1 = −0.5vart(st+1) + εt+1 (3)
where ρt+1 ≡ st+1 − st + it − i
∗
t and εt+1 is an i.i.d. error term. If the term with conditional
variance is negligible, ρt+1 can be simply interpreted as an excess return on domestic currency.
Equations (1)-(3) apply to risk neutral agents. More general formulation of the UIP condition
can be derived from the Euler equation in the model of utility maximising agents. For example,
Bekaert and Hodrick (1993) demonstrate that:220
ρt+1 = covt(st+1, qt+1)− 0.5vart(st+1) + εt+1 (4)
where covt(st+1, qt+1) is the conditional covariance between the exchange rate and the (log of
the) intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of a dollar between period t and t + 1, qt+1.
The attitudes towards risk enter this equation through the conditional covariance. For example,
under risk aversion, ρt+1 is positive because agents need to be paid a risk premium to hold
domestic assets.225
Engel (2016) explains that ρt+1 is ‘the object of almost all of the empirical analysis of excess
returns in foreign exchange markets’. In other words, both conditional variance and covariance
are rarely included in the regression tests of the UIP condition. The well-known finding in this
literature is that the behaviour of the exchange rate is puzzling: ‘[...] when the interest rate (one
country relative to another) is higher than average, the short-term deposits of the high-interest230
rate currency tend to earn an excess return’ (Engel, 2016), so:
cov(Etρt+1, it − i
∗
t ) > 0. (5)
This finding is considered the uncovered interest rate parity puzzle because, according to the
UIP condition, an increase (decrease) in the interest rate differential is offset by subsequent
depreciation (appreciation) of domestic currency, so no relationship between the excess return
and interest rate differential should be observed.235
Bussiere et al. (2018) demonstrate that the relationship between the exchange rate and in-
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terest rates can be decomposed using the following equations:
ft − st = −(it − i
∗








set+1 = st+1 − ε
f
t+1 (8)
where ft is the (log of the) forward exchange rate at time t for delivery at time t+ 1. Equation
(6) is the covered interest rate parity condition and εcipt represents deviations due to transactions
costs, measurement errors etc. (see, e.g., Thornton, 2019). Equation (7) indicates that the240
forward rate is equal to the market participants’ expectation of the future spot rate corrected by
an exchange risk premium, εrpt . Equation (8) states that the expectations are formed rationally:
the right-hand side of this equation is simply Etst+1 (the conditional variance is neglected). These
three equations can be used to derive equation (3) (up to the neglected conditional variance term)







A simple regression-based test of the UIP condition can be specified using the Fama regression:
ρt+1 = ζ + β(it − i
∗
t ) + εt+1 (9)
and the null hypothesis that both coefficients are zero.2 Using equations (6)-(8), Bussiere et al.






















var(it − i∗t )
. (10)
Thus, a non-zero estimate of β can stem from the deviations from the covered interest rate
parity, a time-varying risk premium, and departures from rational expectations. Their relative
importance in CEE countries is examined in the empirical part of the paper.
The foreign exchange (FX) market interventions can affect the observed changes in the ex-
change rate. For example, interventions based on the ‘leaning against the wind’ rule would255
generally reduce fluctuations in the exchange rate without corresponding changes in the inter-
est rates. If it is uncertain whether a monetary authority will continue to intervene, then the
agents have to take it into account when forming their expectations about the exchange rate. A
framework similar to the one used in the literature to model uncertainty about the future shift
in the regime can be applied here (see, e.g., Sarno and Taylor, 2003). This framework is helpful260
to interpret the results obtained for Czechia in Section 6.
Let us assume that agents expect a monetary authority to continue (sterilized) FX interven-
tions with probability (1 − λ) and to shift to a policy of no interventions with probability λ.
Given that the expected exchange rate is not the same under the two regimes:
Etst+k = (1− λ)Et(st+k|M1) + λEt(st+k|M2) (11)
where M1 and M2 are old and new regimes, respectively. If the regime shift does not occur, the265
2It is common in the literature to use the change in the exchange rate as a dependent variable, not the excess
return, and treat the U.S. dollar as a domestic currency. In such a case the null is that β equals 1.
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forecast error is:
sM1t+1 − Etst+1 = ηt+1 + λ∇st+1 (12)
where sM1t+1 is the actual exchange rate at time t+1 in an old regime, ηt+1 = s
M1
t+1 −Et(st+1|M1)
is the rational expectation forecast error, i.e. the error that would be observed if agents were
certain that a monetary authority would continue its interventions, and ∇st+1 ≡ Et(st+1|M1)−
Et(st+1|M2). Using (12) in (2), one obtains that:270
sM1t+1 − st + it − i
∗
t = −0.5vart(st+1) + λ∇st+1 + ηt+1. (13)
Three remarks seem to be relevant here. First, when there is an appreciation (depreciation) pres-
sure that the central bank tries to mitigate by buying (selling) foreign currency, the interventions
can contribute to a downward (upward) revision of the expected exchange rate (the signalling
channel). This implies that an excess return on domestic currency (again neglecting the term
with conditional variance) is negatively (positively) related to purchases (sales) of foreign cur-275
rency by the central bank. For example, if a dummy for purchases of foreign currency is used as
a proxy of ∇st+1, then the coefficient of this dummy is negative. It is because under appreciation
pressure ∇st+1 becomes negative.
Second, monetary authorities change the relative supplies of domestic and foreign assets (the
portfolio balance channel). Thus, FX interventions affect the relative value of these assets and280
this – given that interventions are sterilized, and assets are not perfect substitutes – results in
the alleviation of appreciation/depreciation pressure.
Third, the uncertainty about a shift in an FX intervention policy will result in a skewed
forecast error distribution. The size of skewness depends on the probability of a regime shift, its
likely scale, and it can prevail even after the regime shift until market participants get convinced285
that there will be no return to an old regime.
Additional insights into the Fama regression coefficient and its possible deviations from the
UIP relationship are offered by Farhi and Gabaix (2016) in their rare disaster hypothesis (RDH).
The hypothesis is well-fitted to the CEE countries’ characteristics as their currencies can be con-
sidered more risky than the major currencies. According to the RDH, a country that is perceived290
as relatively risky has a high interest rate and weak currency because investors need to be com-
pensated for the risk of depreciation of that currency during a potential world disaster. Thus,
positive expected returns from investing in a high interest rate currency are simply compensation
for bearing disaster risk.
The implication for the Fama regressions is that the β coefficient should deviate from its UIP295
value. The reason is that it is a weighted average of two terms: a) the coefficient derived from the
rare disaster model of an exchange rate with no inflation, and b) the coefficient implied by the
UIP. Farhi and Gabaix (2016) demonstrate that the former is determined by the world intensity
of disasters and the country’s resilience to such disasters and is smaller than the coefficient
implied by the UIP. Accordingly, the β coefficient can be written as:300
β = νβNI + (1− ν)βUIP (14)
where βNI is the coefficient derived from the rare disaster model setup with no inflation. The
9
weighting parameter ν depends on the variability of inflation differential, σ2π, and the variability









where c is a positive scaling constant. Using these equations, one can observe that the more
variable the inflation differential, the closer the β coefficient to the coefficient implied by the305
UIP. Conversely, the higher the variability in the country’s relative resilience, the greater the
deviation of β from its UIP level. The implication is, therefore, that the relative importance of
these two variabilities should be negatively associated with the deviations from the UIP condition,
i.e., the higher the ratio of inflation differential variability to the variability in the relative country
resilience, the smaller the deviation from the UIP relationship.310
4 Empirical models and data
This section presents a sequence of empirical models, along with the description of the estimation
procedures and data used in the paper. Coming back to the definition of the excess return on
domestic currency (used in Equation 3), we define our baseline forward premium regression
(Model 1) as:315
ρt+1 = ζ + β(it − i
∗
t ) + εt+1, (16)
where εt is i.i.d.N(0, σ
2
ε). Following the standard Fama regression, β > 0 indicates a positive
relationship between the excess returns and interest differentials, the anomaly described as the
UIP puzzle.
In Model 2, the benchmark equation is augmented with the realized volatility (RV) of the
exchange rate:320
ρt+1 = ζ + β(it − i
∗
t ) + γv
2
t+1 + εt+1. (17)








where sm,t is the log of the daily exchange rate and Mt is the number of trading days, changing
each month.
Following the ample literature on the role of the exchange rate volatility for the UIP tests, in325
the next specification, we explicitly account for the potential heteroskedasticity in the baseline
regression residuals. Hence, Model 3 (GARCH) is a set-up extended with a GARCH(1, 1) process:
ρt+1 = ζ + β(it − i
∗
t ) + εt+1 (19a)
εt = ztσt (19b)






where zt has the skewed Student-t distribution (sstd), ω ≥ 0, α1 ≥ 0, β1 ≥ 0, and α1+β1 < 1. It
must be noted here that before this form of Model 3 was selected, we examined multiple GARCH330
specifications, i.a., exponential, component, and GJR GARCH processes, with in-variance or
in-mean GARCH terms, and various residual distributions. The results obtained under these
specifications were qualitatively quite similar to those from the GARCH-sstd model, but their
statistical properties were inferior, e.g., the residuals were serially correlated.
The next equation, which we call Model 4, extends the previous models with several financial335







We estimate this model with various combinations of regressors. ∆vixt+1, ∆tedt+1, kiliant+1,
and ∆epu_eut+1 denote the indicators of international financial risk (VIX), liquidity risk (TED
spread), the global index of economic activity (Kilian, 2009), which approximates the overall340
macroeconomic risk, as well as the economic policy uncertainty in Europe, a news-based indicator
put forward by Baker et al. (2016).
The inclusion of these variables in the regression may be traced back to theoretical expla-
nations for the UIP failure. The risk-taking behaviour is likely to change along financial and
business cycles in the world economy due to common drivers of volatility. Risk fluctuations,345
in turn, tend to shape cross-border portfolio flows which impact the risk premia that investors
demand for holding certain assets. Hence, the risk measures may be treated as control variables
that potentially alter the relationship between interest rate differentials and the excess return in
the benchmark regression model.
An important part of our empirical analysis consists of the decomposition of the UIP slope350
deviations from the theoretical value of zero (when the UIP holds) in Equation (16). However,
it must be noted that we face a shortage of data on market expectations or forecasts of exchange
rates across the CEE economies over a longer period. Because these series are needed to calculate
the risk premium and expectation error terms in Equations (7) and (8), the estimated β cannot
be decomposed as shown in Equation (10). Given these limitations, in this paper we suggest a355
simple alternative to achieve this decomposition. The procedure we introduce consists of four
steps.
In the first step, we obtain the error term that may be worked out directly from the data,
i.e., the CIP error. It is calculated with observable forward and spot rates, as well as domestic
and foreign interest rates, as in Equation (6), εcipt = ft − st + it − i
∗
t .360
Next, we postulate that the risk premium can be disentangled from the full εt+1 error using
additional information embedded in a major risk factor that likely drives this premium. We
assume here that this variable should be highly correlated with the risk premium chunk of the
UIP error term and not with its remainder. The CBOE VIX, used to proxy the global risk levels
and often dubbed the ‘fear index’, seems to be a plausible choice of such a factor. Hence, we365
regress the UIP error series εt+1 on a constant and the log rate of growth of VIX:
εt+1 = α0 + α1∆vixt+1 + ut+1. (21)
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In the third step, the risk premium term is retrieved as the fitted value of the OLS regression,
ε̂
rp
t = α̂0 + α̂1∆vixt. Because the residuals of the regression still contain both the forecast and
CIP errors, the former one is isolated as the following difference, ε̂ft+1 = ût+1 − ε
cip
t .
Finally, given the estimates of the three error terms, we may use them to break down the370
UIP deviations into the CIP, risk premium, and forecast components, and assess their relative
importance.
The dataset that we collect covers four CEE economies: Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and
Romania, for a maximum period of 1999 to 2019. The spot exchange rates are in monthly
frequency, defined as end-of-month daily observations. There are three reference currencies, the375
U.S. dollar, the euro, and the Swiss franc, and in each case we standardize the exchange rate
series. The regressions are based on the 1-month money market interest rates, which are again
taken as the end-of-month values and transformed from annual into monthly rates.
The data on the forward rates turns out to be more problematic because their availability
differs across economies. As far as the U.S. dollar and the euro are concerned, the series cover the380
entire time span of 1999:01 to 2019:12 with just three exceptions. The PLN/EUR, RON/EUR,
and RON/USD series start later, between 2002 and 2004. The forward rates for the CEE
currencies and the Swiss franc are either unavailable or cover a very short period, going back
just a few years. Hence, some parts of the empirical analysis cannot be conducted for the franc.
In addition to individual data, we calculate two aggregated series for the CEE economies. The385
V3 aggregate includes the non-euro Visegrad Group countries, Czechia, Hungary, and Poland.
The V3R aggregate adds Romania to the group. Aggregate exchange rates and interest rates
are computed using the geometric weighted mean and constant trade weights (sum of exports
and imports) based on annual data for 1995-2019. As suggested by Engel (2016), such a setting
may be superior to a pooled panel regression because it is unlikely that all four economies will390
be characterized by the same estimates of β.
All exchange rate and interest rate series were obtained from the Refinitiv Datastream. Trade
weights used to calculate the aggregates come from the Eurostat database. Risk measures are
retrieved from the datasets indicated above, with the exception of the TED spread that comes
from the Federal Reserve Economic Database.395
5 Results and discussion
This section presents and discusses our empirical findings. We start with the outcomes of baseline
Fama regressions for the CEE economies. We then tackle the problem of a structural break in
these regressions and decompose their slope coefficients. Next, we discuss the UIP regressions
augmented with various risk measures and compare various specifications across the economies.400
5.1 Baseline Fama regressions
The baseline UIP regressions are estimated for four economies and two aggregates, V3 and V3R,
based on weighted averages of interest rates and exchange rates in the CEE economies (Table
1). In each case, there are three reference currencies. Out of the total number of 18 regressions,
the estimates of β (a coefficient on it − i
∗
t ) are statistically significant at the conventional levels405
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in 11 cases. In general, the results are more supportive of the UIP when the U.S. dollar is
the reference currency and indicate deviations from the parity vis-à-vis the euro and the Swiss
franc. This pattern repeats for Poland, Romania, and V3 and V3R aggregates, although point
estimates of β for Romania are much lower and below 1. Czechia is the only economy where
the slope is not significant for the EUR and the CHF, which means that the UIP also holds410
against these two benchmarks. Conversely, the point estimates of β are high for Hungary (all
three above 1.5) and statistically significant in all three specifications, pointing to a firm rejection
of the UIP. The estimates of regression intercepts, in turn, are almost never significant. Two
notable exceptions are the negative intercepts for Hungary when the CHF or the EUR are taken
as reference currencies, making it the only economy with a non-zero constant risk premium.415
Table 1: Baseline UIP regression results for CEE economies








0.136 1.322 0.34 8.04 4.87 43.61 612.71
[0.181] [0.370] [0.563] [0.625] [0.027] [0.000] [0.000]
USD
0.125 0.140 0.17 11.27 0.07 39.15 14.85
[0.603] [0.943] [0.679] [0.336] [0.787] [0.000] [0.215]
CHF
-0.095 1.721 3.14 13.76 0.45 4.94 221180.18
[0.682] [0.322] [0.077] [0.184] [0.500] [0.895] [0.000]
Hungary
EUR
-0.312 1.527 0.31 28.80 1.66 35.71 14948.51
[0.053] [0.000] [0.575] [0.001] [0.197] [0.000] [0.000]
USD
-0.320 1.591 0.13 12.59 0.12 47.77 16179.78
[0.224] [0.024] [0.715] [0.248] [0.725] [0.000] [0.000]
CHF
-0.507 1.510 0.36 21.02 6.13 53.26 1505.63
[0.059] [0.001] [0.551] [0.021] [0.013] [0.000] [0.000]
Poland
EUR
-0.173 1.526 9.66 17.90 26.05 56.72 39.49
[0.485] [0.008] [0.002] [0.057] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007]
USD
0.127 0.491 0.67 11.74 0.07 34.99 1321.54
[0.675] [0.417] [0.412] [0.303] [0.785] [0.000] [0.000]
CHF
-0.274 1.268 0.15 7.49 1.65 37.75 1458.83
[0.362] [0.036] [0.701] [0.678] [0.199] [0.000] [0.000]
Romania
EUR
0.010 0.434 0.43 9.92 17.21 27.26 14954.21
[0.945] [0.003] [0.512] [0.447] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]
USD
0.104 0.297 1.00 9.78 3.53 24.91 1320.38
[0.682] [0.100] [0.318] [0.460] [0.060] [0.006] [0.000]
CHF
-0.115 0.451 0.62 7.12 5.28 9.70 1454.08
[0.597] [0.003] [0.429] [0.714] [0.022] [0.467] [0.000]
V3
EUR
0.119 1.532 10.79 22.68 34.72 76.92 177.72
[0.474] [0.001] [0.001] [0.0123] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
USD
0.094 0.567 0.28 12.68 0.01 40.90 1458.99
[0.708] [0.489] [0.599] [0.242] [0.942] [0.000] [0.000]
CHF
-0.243 1.291 0.08 8.48 4.52 32.63 15394.96
[0.336] [0.026] [0.773] [0.582] [0.034] [0.000] [0.000]
V3R
EUR
-0.058 1.026 12.64 24.89 40.05 78.28 172.03
[0.683] [0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
USD
0.098 0.461 0.41 12.82 0.015 41.81 600.61
[0.703] [0.389] [0.524] [0.234] [0.902] [0.000] [0.000]
CHF
-0.197 0.974 0.01 7.29 5.60 29.86 15397.73
[0.378] [0.006] [0.929] [0.697] [0.018] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: dependent variable: ρt+1, see Equation (16); V3 is the aggregate for Czechia, Hun-
gary, and Poland, based on trade weights; V3R adds Romania to the aggregate; estimation
period: 1999:12 - 2019:12; p-values calculated with HAC robust standard errors in brackets;
Q1, Q10 and Q21, Q
2
10
indicate the Ljung-Box statistics for the first 1 and 10 autocorrelations
of standardized residuals and squared standardized residuals; χ2 is the Pearson goodness-of-
fit test statistic, calculated for empirical histograms with 20 bins.
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Since most of the reported regressions display serial correlation of residuals, as confirmed by
the Ljung-Box statistics, we calculate the robust standard errors to correct for a possible bias in
the estimates of β. It must be noted, however, that potential misspecification of the baseline UIP
regression may also be reflected in the correlation of squared residuals and their non-normality,
as indicated by further residual diagnostics. We come back to these issues in Sections 5.4 and420
5.5 where we consider augmented UIP regression models.
So far, our main finding from the baseline Fama regressions is that the UIP puzzle appears
in most of the tested currency pairs. It means, for example, that a change in the interest rate
differential between the CEE economy and the Eurozone or Switzerland is a significant predictor
of the excess returns on their domestic currencies. This result is consistent with the majority425
of the literature, which shows that the UIP puzzle occurs more often for economies maintaining
floating exchange rate arrangements, low capital controls, and low inflation rates (e.g., Engel and
Zhu, 2019), such as the CEE economies in most of the period that we investigate. However, we
also find a considerable variation in our results. The primary one is the difference in β estimates
for the euro and the Swiss franc, on the one hand, and the U.S. dollar, on the other. Apart from430
Hungary, there are no failures of the UIP for the USD, which suggests the UIP holds more often
in this case than for the two European currencies.
5.2 Structural breaks in the UIP regressions
In the baseline specification of the Fama regression, we test whether the UIP holds on average
between 1999 and 2019 using monthly data. However, as shown by Bussiere et al. (2018), among435
others, a case may be made for a structural break in this relationship that appears around the
GFC (2007-2009). In particular, the UIP may hold strongly during the crisis when investors
forcefully adjust their positions, while persistent deviations from the UIP occur during ‘normal
times’ (Brunnermeier et al., 2008; Clarida et al., 2009). In our case, the results may be influenced,
for example, by a reversal in capital flows to and from the CEE economies around the GFC440
(Cuestas et al., 2017). Conceivably, such breaks make the estimates of regression parameters
unstable over time. Due to its sensitivity to extreme observations, the slope of our regressions
may also switch signs, ranging from large positive to large negative values in some subperiods
(Thornton, 2019). What is more, for most of the post-crisis period the interest rates in the
U.S. remained near zero, and the adjustment of the interest rate differential part of the testing445
equation could be driven by unconventional monetary policy shocks in the U.S. (e.g., signalling
or portfolio balance channels of the quantitative easing). In the EMU and Switzerland, the policy
rates also reached zero or negative values. The European Central Bank (ECB) actively engaged
in its non-standard measures post-2012, while the Swiss National Bank (SNB) kept the franc
pegged to EUR from 2011 to 2015.450
To take into account possible structural breaks in the UIP regressions, we run the Chow break-
point tests using a grid search for each of the baseline regressions. The resulting F-statistics,
along with the probable breakpoint dates, are presented in Table 2. We find evidence for signif-
icant structural breaks in only four out of 18 tested cases. To some surprise, even though some
of the break dates appear around the GFC (Poland, Czechia, and both aggregates against the455
USD), none of them turns out to be significant at the conventional levels. Hence, in general, we
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do not find considerable support for the conjecture that the GFC had a significant impact on
the UIP regression slopes in the CEE economies.
Table 2: Structural breaks in the UIP regressions - the Chow test
Date F-stat p-value Date F-stat p-value
Czechia
EUR 2008/06 7.765 0.224
Romania
EUR 2003/12 8.185 0.192
USD 2008/06 4.979 0.563 USD 2014/06 10.087 0.092
CHF 2014/12 115.08 0.000 CHF 2015/01 6.133 0.395
Hungary
EUR 2016/06 3.103 0.874
V3
EUR 2012/11 9.643 0.109
USD 2002/02 3.820 0.758 USD 2008/07 7.199 0.275
CHF 2015/06 6.260 0.379 CHF 2008/07 6.866 0.309
Poland
EUR 2016/03 12.591 0.032
V3R
EUR 2004/01 6.286 0.376
USD 2008/07 6.369 0.366 USD 2008/07 8.453 0.174
CHF 2015/01 16.034 0.007 CHF 2016/07 13.832 0.019
Notes: the Chow parameter instability test based on the baseline regression model (see Equation 16);
estimation period: 1999:12 - 2019:12; first and last 15% of observations trimmed during the breakpoint
search.
At the same time, the Chow tests indicate breaks in the latter part of the sample for Czechia
and Poland. In both cases, the breakpoint for the CHF is detected in late 2014 or early 2015,460
around the time when the SNB discontinued its currency peg to the EUR. This decision culmi-
nated in an abrupt shock to the CEE FX markets. Hence, the structural breaks in this period
indicate that the relationship between interest rate differentials and excess returns on CEE cur-
rencies was subject to instabilities during a substantial, unexpected shift in the monetary policy
strategy of the SNB. Poland is the only case in which we also detect a significant breakpoint for465
the EUR in March 2016. A possible explanation could be that around this period the monetary
policies in Poland and the Eurozone started to become more divergent. While the ECB was
engaging in further unconventional policies, including quantitative easing, the National Bank of
Poland kept the interest rates unchanged for a longer period. Finally, we also find a structural
break for V3R aggregate and the CHF, although even later in the sample (mid-2016). Overall,470
however, the evidence for structural breaks is rather weak, so we proceed with the next steps of
the analysis using the whole sample.
5.3 Decomposition of the UIP slope coefficients
Additionally to the joint tests of the forward premium puzzle, we further isolate the error terms
in the UIP equations using market forward rates and VIX as an international risk measure.475
This allows us to decompose β into three sources of deviations from the UIP hypothesis, which
states that β = 0. Figure 1 depicts these deviations. The forecast error turns out to be the
most important driver of the departure from the UIP across the CEE economies. For almost all
currency pairs, it displays a positive impact on point estimates of β, indicating a substantial and
persistent bias in the expectations of the FX market participants. In as many as five out of eight480
cases, this error raises the slope parameter value by more than one. The three exceptions are the
CZK/USD and PLN/EUR currency pairs, where the contribution of the forecast error is smaller
than the risk premium error, and the PLN/USD pair for which this contribution is around 0.5.
Much like the forecast error, the risk premium component positively influences β estimates.
In general, a time-varying risk premium appears to generate a relatively minor distortion to the485
UIP condition. In Czechia, Hungary, and Romania, the contribution of the risk premium error
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is larger for the U.S. dollar than for the euro. This may indicate a more significant role of the
dollar as a global risk factor and the fact that its value is related to shifts in risk-taking attitudes
of international investors (Bruno and Shin, 2015). The same, however, is not true for the Polish
zloty and the euro. This currency pair again stands as an outlier and exhibits a comparatively490
large risk premium error.
Figure 1: Decomposition of the slope parameter in baseline UIP regressions for CEE economies
Notes: see Equation (10); the sample for PLN/EUR covers the period 2003:01 - 2019:12, while samples for RON/EUR and
RON/USD, the period 2004:03 - 2019:12.
The third component, the CIP error, turns out to be of much lesser importance than the two
remaining factors. Its impact on β estimates is slightly larger only for Romania and the USD,
as well as for Czechia and the USD relationships. The results do not indicate a considerable
covered interest parity failure that could appear, for example, due to a rise in risk related to495
individual financial institutions. It is despite the fact that our calculations are based on domestic
interest rates rather than assets that are comparable in terms of all characteristics, such as the
Euro-currency deposits (see Sarno and Taylor, 2003), which are not fully available for the CEE
economies. A limited role of the CIP error speaks to the small transactions costs attributed to
CEE currencies. This, in turn, may be attributed to open financial accounts and the absence of500
capital controls in those economies.
5.4 UIP regressions augmented with risk measures: the CEE economies ag-
gregate
To provide a more detailed picture of the UIP relationships in CEE economies, we estimate a set
of augmented regression models. Because there are as many as 90 regression specifications for505
all CEE economies, their aggregates, and three reference currencies, at this point, we introduce
only five regression models calculated for the V3R group before going to a summary of the rest
of the results. It must be noted that due to the decidedly similar outcomes that we obtain for
the EUR and the CHF, we do not report the latter case in this and the following subsection.
The set of regressions calculated for the Swiss franc reveals a similar pattern of positive values510
on the estimated UIP coefficient.3
Table 3 shows the results for the EUR. Typically for this reference currency, significant
and positive estimates of β in the baseline regression imply the puzzle’s existence. Further
3Those results are available upon request.
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specifications, augmented with risk measures, corroborate the initial conclusions regarding the
UIP puzzle. They indicate that risk-aversion of market participants is indeed time-varying, as515
indicated by statically significant estimates of coefficients on the realized volatility of the exchange
rate and VIX. What is more, the point estimates on v2t in Model 2 are very close to -0.5, which
correspond to their anticipated value (see Equation 2). The same is true for the TED spread
and Kilian’s measure of global economic activity. This confirms the results from the previous
sections, in particular a significant impact of various risk factors on currency excess returns.520
At the same time, the inclusion of risk measures improves the overall performance of the
regression models by fixing the autocorrelation of the residuals that we presented before. The
specifications in which the GARCH components are introduced tend to alleviate the autocorre-
lation of squared residuals. This indicates that the extension of the UIP regressions is justified
from the point of view of the time series properties used in the study, and the UIP relationship525
likely contains a non-constant volatility term. Interestingly, even though the extensions to the
baseline regression seem to be substantiated, the estimates of β do not change. The estimates
are always statistically significant and within a range from 1.018 to 1.266.
Table 3: Model estimates for the V3R group vis-à-vis the euro












- - - - -
12.64 24.89 40.05 78.28 172.0
[0.683] [0.000] [0.000] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Model 2: RV
0.207 1.234 -0.501
- - - -
4.61 13.44 10.27 99.06 174.2
[0.078] [0.000] [0.001] [0.032] [0.200] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Model 3: GARCH
-0.037 1.018
- - - - -
3.57 14.86 0.01 8.97 22.39






3.70 13.64 0.00 6.00 35.61
[0.306] [0.000] [0.000] [0.054] [0.190] [0.961] [0.815] [0.011]
Model 4b: GARCH+risk
0.104 1.266 -0.445 -1.768 -0.855 0.004 -0.002 0.05 12.25 0.59 11.64 8.36
[0.196] [0.000] [0.021] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.167] [0.831] [0.269] [0.441] [0.310] [0.982]





10 indicate the Ljung-Box statistics for the first 1 and 10 autocorrelations of standardized residuals and squared
standardized residuals; χ2 is the Pearson goodness-of-fit test statistic, calculated for empirical histograms with 20 bins.
Table 4 presents the detailed regression results for the V3R group vis-à-vis USD. Unlike in
the EUR case, the results show the lack of a significant positive relationship between interest rate530
differentials between the entire CEE economies and the U.S., it−i
∗
t , and the excess return against
the dollar, ρt+1, although the point estimates of β increase in some of the specifications (Models
2 and 4b). Signs on risk measures align with our expectations, but the estimated coefficient on
the realized volatility is markedly higher than -0.5. An increase in the global risk measures is
negatively related to the excess returns on CEE currency, even though the UIP holds in this535
case for the USD. As indicated by regression diagnostics, the overall misspecification of the
baseline regression seems to be smaller than in the EUR case. In particular, there is no notable
autocorrelation in the baseline regression residuals. Still, the risk measures and the GARCH
functions improve the overall performance of the models.
The differences between the results for the V3R and the two reference currencies must be540
considered a bit surprising for at least two reasons. First, various risk measures do not account
for the failure of the UIP in EUR, but they tend to improve the baseline specification. Second,
there is a consistent difference between the euro and the U.S. dollar, with the former indicating
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Table 4: Model estimates for the V3R group vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar












- - - - -
0.41 12.82 0.02 41.81 600.6
[0.381] [0.861] [0.524] [0.243] [0.902] [0.000] [0.001]
Model 2: RV
0.536 0.599 -0.320
- - - -
0.01 11.57 0.29 52.62 39.16
[0.043] [0.270] [0.009] [0.913] [0.315] [0.593] [0.000] [0.009]
Model 3: GARCH
0.122 0.447
- - - - -
0.69 7.02 1.37 13.54 16.64






0.53 5.75 2.52 16.14 18.72
[0.683] [0.419] [0.009] [0.466] [0.836] [0.112] [0.095] [0.475]
Model 4b: GARCH+risk
0.280 0.569 -0.201 -2.386 -0.235 0.006 -0.004 0.05 5.06 3.20 21.48 13.62
[0.194] [0.328] [0.000] [0.020] [0.781] [0.008] [0.053] [0.825] [0.887] [0.074] [0.018] [0.805]
Notes: see Table 3.
the UIP puzzle. As we turn to the summary of the results, we ask whether the same conclusions
can be made for other currency pairs.545
5.5 UIP regressions augmented with risk measures: a summary
This subsection reports a summary of β estimates in the baseline and extended regression mod-
els.4 The barplot in Figure 2 depicts 90-percent confidence intervals for the EUR. It must be
noted that all intervals except the ones for Czechia are located in the positive territory and do
not include zero even in the most expanded form. This indicates an enduring UIP puzzle for all550
other economies, including the V3 aggregate. Confidence intervals are only slightly narrower as
we move to the augmented regressions, but not for all cases. The inclusion of the exchange rate,
realized volatility, or global risk proxies does not substantially change the estimates of β. On
average, the CEE currencies appreciate when their domestic interest rates are higher than in the
EMU, which violates the UIP. When we omit the singular Czech case, the confidence intervals555
for β are shifting more for Hungary and Poland than for Romania, where they become visibly
narrower.
Figure 2: 90-percent confidence intervals of β in the UIP regressions for the euro
4Detailed results are available upon request.
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Barplots constructed for the USD give further explanation for differences in the distribution
of β in the Fama regression across economies and their aggregates (Figure 3). We find clear
evidence that the UIP against the USD holds in Czechia and Poland. This translates into560
similar results for the V3 and V3R aggregates. Deviations from the UIP are slightly stronger
for Hungary and Romania. However, for both economies, confidence intervals exclude zero by a
minimal margin. In the Hungarian case, the UIP puzzle becomes even more visible when β is
estimated in a model with realized volatility.
Figure 3: 90-percent confidence intervals of β in the UIP regressions for the U.S. dollar
The summary of the results that we obtain for the CEE economies shows that the estimated565
UIP slopes differ across countries, but there is little variation within economies and the aug-
mented specifications produce comparable results for a given economy or a group of countries.
Even though subsequent specifications, the ones that control for various risk measures or include
GARCH parts, may be justified, both from economic and statistical points of view, they do not
alter our previous conclusions on the UIP puzzle.570
One of the noteworthy features of our results is the persistent contrast between the UIP
test outcomes for the EUR and the USD. In the former case, the evidence against the UIP
is categorically stronger, while the parity predominantly holds for the U.S. dollar exchange
rates. The existence of the UIP puzzle for the euro may be considered surprising since all the
CEE economies exhibit strong economic and financial ties with the EMU, more specifically with575
Germany. However, if we recognize that the empirical studies reviewed in Section 2 consistently
indicate UIP deviations for the U.S. dollar, rather than confirm the UIP, it is the nonexistence of
the puzzle for the dollar that raises more questions. A compelling rationale for the nonappearance
of the UIP puzzle for the dollar was put forward in a recent study by Engel et al. (2021). This
anation is related to a major shift in the U.S. monetary policy after the GFC. In this period, the580
Fed cut the interest rates almost to zero and turned to forward guidance, quantitative easing,
and other non-standard programs. As it started to react to economic and financial developments,
including inflation rates, with unconventional tools, the interest rate ceased to be its primary
policy instrument. Hence, interest rates in the U.S. fluctuated very little, which undermined
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their predictive power for the dollar exchange rates. This phenomenon seems to be confirmed585
for the CEE currencies. Even though the Fed was not the only central bank that turned to
unconventional monetary policies, and the European Central Bank eventually followed this path
as well, the effective lower bound prevailed in the U.S. for an extended period, from late 2008 to
late 2015, and the Fed’s policies were generally more swift and forceful.
6 Extensions590
This section contains three extensions to our main results using additional data. In the Czech
case, we consider the Czech National Bank’s (CNB) foreign exchange interventions conducted
while keeping the exchange rate pegged to the euro. For Poland, we augment the UIP regressions
with survey-based expectations of the PLN/EUR and PLN/USD exchange rates. The third
extension investigates the rare disaster hypothesis with option-implied risk reversals of CEE595
currencies.
6.1 Czechia: central bank foreign exchange interventions
Out of the four CEE economies that we investigate in this paper, Czechia is the only one that
steered away from a standard interest rate policy by introducing an explicit form of the exchange
rate control. Starting in 2008, the CNB lowered interest rates by roughly four percentage points,600
and in late 2012 its main policy reached 0.05%. At the same time, it introduced forward guid-
ance to communicate that its monetary policy would remain expansionary. However, the Czech
economy was still experiencing stark consequences of the GFC and the euro area debt crisis,
most notably the deflationary tendencies. Searching for extraordinary policy options but unable
to bring interest rates below zero and reluctant to start quantitative easing, the CNB decided to605
alleviate the zero lower bound by deploying an additional instrument, the exchange rate control
(see Bruha and Tonner, 2018). In November 2013, the bank announced a one-sided peg of the
Czech koruna to the euro. It aimed to prevent appreciation of the koruna below EUR/CZK 27
level in order to boost the national economy and bring the inflation rate closer to the 2% target.
While maintaining this target, the CNB carried out large-scale foreign exchange interventions.610
The exchange rate commitment was terminated in April 2017.
To account for the unique features of Czech monetary policy post-2012 and their possible
implication for the validity of the UIP tests, we run a set of regressions that encompass foreign
exchange interventions of the CNB. The regressions are estimated for the koruna and the euro in
the entire period of 1999-2019. However, they contain two additional dummy variables. The first615
one, which we denote as ‘positive’ foreign exchange interventions, takes the value of 1 in a month
when the CNB conducted net purchases of the euro-denominated assets and zero otherwise. The
second dummy, a proxy for ‘negative’ interventions, is defined in an analogous manner.
The outcome of the extended regression models is presented in Table 5. We first report two
UIP regressions without foreign exchange interventions, Models 3 and 4c. As discussed before,620
neither of the estimated slope coefficients are significant, and these models indicate the UIP
holds for the CZK/EUR currency pair. The additional models 5a and 5b, however, produce
considerably higher, significant estimates of coefficients on the interest rate differential. The
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point estimate of β jumps from below two in regressions 3 and 4c to above four in the additional
model. In model 5a, we find that net sales (negfxit) rather than net purchases (posfxit) had625
a substantial impact on the CZK excess returns. The coefficient on negative foreign exchange
interventions remains significant, even after we control for the major risk measures, the realized
volatility of the exchange rate and VIX. Still, the inclusion of both of these measures in Model
5b seems justified, which indicates that foreign exchange interventions capture a different source
of distortion to the UIP than the overall risk in financial markets.630
Table 5: Model estimates for Czechia and the EUR: central bank foreign exchange interventions












- - - -
0.02 3.94 0.27 1.78 30.04
[0.464] [0.282] [0.888] [0.950] [0.600] [0.998] [0.051]
Model 4c: GARCH+risk
0.102 1.806 -0.080 -0.466
- -
0.03 4.47 0.39 2.17 21.75




-0.106 0.431 0.00 4.39 0.20 1.82 13.62
[0.860] [0.010] [0.365] [0.014] [0.973] [0.928] [0.655] [0.998] [0.805]
Model 5b: GARCH+czfx
0.117 4.052 -0.435 -0.455 -0.184 0.574 0.06 7.52 0.16 2.56 16.81
[0.241] [0.005] [0.035] [0.058] [0.124] [0.002] [0.812] [0.676] [0.685] [0.990] [0.602]
Notes: see Table 3.
The results from the extended regressions show that once we account for the central bank’s
FX interventions, the UIP puzzle emerges for Czechia and the euro. Hence, the Czech case, a
clear outlier in previous tests, now matches the results for other CEE economies. This suggests
that the period when the CNB kept its currency pegged to the euro is related to a substantial
distortion in the UIP condition. There are at least three plausible explanations for this finding.635
First, foreign exchange interventions may have a direct impact on the returns of foreign
versus domestic assets and capital flows to the Czech economy, possibly changing the default or
liquidity risk of assets denominated in the Czech koruna. In fact, this is confirmed by Frait and
Mora (2020), who point out to shifts in capital flows, the yield curve of Czech securities, and the
liquidity of the domestic banking sector during this period.640
Second, by setting an exchange rate peg to the euro, the CNB explicitly changed its reaction
function to the inflation rate and output gap developments in the Czech economy, which the
bank actively communicated. After more than a decade of direct inflation targeting and floating
exchange rate regime, the CNB veered from its regular monetary policy strategy, as the CNB
saw the exchange rate commitment as an instrument to exit the zero-lower bound. A set of645
simulations conducted by Bruha and Tonner (2018) indicates that the CNB’s policy positively
impacted inflation measures. In particular, it prevented the core inflation rate from falling below
zero (see also Caselli, 2017).
Third, the koruna-euro exchange rate floor brought substantial operational adjustments in
CNB’s monetary policy and the bank’s balance sheet. Together with the central bank’s reaction650
function, its specific operational procedures, such as the type of open market operations it
conducts, may have an impact on the UIP condition (see Backus et al., 2010). Given that
the CNB’s exchange rate commitment was one-sided, it did not have to intervene in the FX
market in a systematic manner. Large, sterilized operations were needed when the peg was
introduced and then after 2015, especially in 2017, when the ECB launched the quantitative655
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easing policies (Czech National Bank, 2017). Such operations, in turn, may have diminished the
relative riskiness of the koruna vis-à-vis the euro and influence the UIP.
6.2 Poland: survey-based exchange rate forecasts
The second extension to the baseline results consists of a case study we conduct for Poland using
professional exchange rate forecasts to approximate market expectations. The empirical founda-660
tion of this exercise comes from a market participants survey conducted by "Rzeczpospolita", a
major Polish nationwide daily newspaper specialized in economic and legal issues.5 On a monthly
basis, analysts working at the largest financial institutions located in Poland - banks, brokers,
or financial groups - are asked to submit their predictions on macroeconomic and financial vari-
ables, among them the PLN/EUR and the PLN/USD exchange rates. The earliest entry in this665
survey comes from December 2013, with forecasts for January 2014, and the database ends in
December 2019. The panel of respondents changes over time, with a maximum number of 41
financial analysts. This dataset provides us with a rare opportunity to re-run the UIP regression
for Poland, in a shorter timespan but using a reliable proxy of actual market expectations and
without imposing additional assumptions on the UIP error decomposition, as in Section 5.3.670
To keep the empirical results comparable with the previous parts of the paper, we introduce
some adjustments to the time series used in the regressions. The surveyed financial analysts are
asked to forecast the average level of the official exchange rates quoted by the National Bank of
Poland for the following month. Hence, in this part of the paper, we also use the averages of
these particular exchange rate quotation instead of the end-of-month market entries. Based on675
individual survey responses, we calculate the median of disaggregated forecasts and use it as a
measure of market expectations. Next, we estimate the basic UIP model, the one without any
additional explanatory variables, and decompose the regression residuals using forward rates and
expectations, according to Equations (6) to (8).
Figure 4 plots the contribution of CIP, risk premium and forecast errors to the overall UIP680
regression error. The average value of forecast error is slightly negative for the EUR and positive
for the USD exchange rates. The converse is true concerning the risk premium error. The CIP
errors are at least an order of magnitude smaller than the remaining components. For both
reference currencies, the risk premium error is highly variable, but the periods of positive or
negative errors seem to be clustered and follow each other in longer ‘swings’, especially for the685
U.S. dollar. For example, over 2015 and 2016, there are only six months when the risk premium
error of the USD regression was positive, while in 2017 alone, the error was greater than zero for
eight months. The forecast error tends to periodically escalate for both currency pairs, possibly
in periods of elevated economic or political uncertainty.
We may now use the errors to explain deviations of the estimated UIP slope coefficients from690
the theoretical value of β = 0. The results of this decomposition are depicted in Figure 5. Point
estimates of β stand at 5.445 for the EUR and -2.484 for the USD, but neither are significant
at the 10% significance level. The forecast error turns out to be dominant for the euro, whereas
the combined CIP and risk premium errors contribute only to 0.792 (or 14%) of the departure
5We thank Mr Grzegorz Siemiończyk, a journalist of the "Rzeczpospolita" newspaper, for making these data
available to us.
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Figure 4: UIP error decomposition for Poland using survey data on exchange rate forecasts
from the UIP. For the U.S. dollar, however, the risk premium plays a leading role. More than695
80% of deviation from zero may be explained by this error component. Unlike for the EUR, all
three components drag the estimate of β downwards, into the negative territory. Hence, we once
again obtain a distinct picture of the UIP relationship for each of the major foreign currencies.
Figure 5: Decomposition of β estimates for Poland using survey data on exchange rate forecasts
Additionally, as β estimates are insignificant, the regression outcomes imply that survey-
based exchange rate expectations on PLN/EUR and PLN/USD are not informed by the UIP700
relationship, at least from 2014 to 2019. Professional forecasters in large financial institutions in
Poland seem not to be guided by interest rate differentials when formulating one month ahead
exchange rate forecasts. In this regard, our results stand at odds with Cuestas et al. (2015)
who find some evidence that forecasters ‘believe’ in the UIP hypothesis in the Polish zloty-euro
market. However, their study covers only the euro exchange rates of CEE currencies between705
2007 and 2014 and employs a different exchange rate forecast data source. Hence, our findings
suggest that post-2014, some macroeconomic or financial factors other than the UIP relationship
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may have a more substantial impact on the market forecasts of the zloty, both vis-à-vis the euro
and the dollar.
6.3 CEE currencies and the rare disaster hypothesis710
The final extension builds on the rare disaster hypothesis (RDH) put forward by Farhi and
Gabaix (2016). As demonstrated in Section 3, the coefficient in the Fama-type regressions can
deviate from the level implied by the UIP because it is a weighted average of the coefficient
derived from the RDH model with no inflation and the UIP coefficient. The deviation is driven
by the variability of inflation differential and the variability of the relative country resilience.715
Before we proceed to analyze these variabilities, it is worthwhile to check if financial market
participants indeed consider the CEE currencies riskier than the major currencies, as required
by the RDH. Following Farhi and Gabaix (2016) we use notions in option theory to quantify the
currency riskiness. The options that protect against a crash of the exchange rate of currency i
against currency j are out-of-the-money puts on currency i. In turn, out-of-the-money calls on720
currency i protect against a crash of the exchange rate of j against i. If currency i is riskier
than currency j, then the implied volatility of out-of-the-money puts is higher than the implied
volatility of out-of-the-money calls. This pattern is known as a ‘smirk’. The risk reversal (RR)
measure is defined as a difference between the implied volatility of out-of-the-money put and
the implied volatility of an out-of-the-money call, and it can be used as an indicator of currency725
riskiness. The higher the RR of currency i, the riskier this currency is.6
Availability of data on the implied volatility of currency options is not uniform across CEE
countries. Relatively long time series can be obtained for the Czech, Hungarian, and Polish
currencies vis-à-vis the euro. Thus, the focus in this extension is on these three currency pairs.
The end-of-month daily data on implied volatilities of put and call options in the period spanning730
from February 2006 to December 2019 are retrieved from the Refinitiv Datastream. In Figure 6,
the RRs for three CEE currencies against the euro are depicted. The RRs for the Hungarian and
Polish currencies are positive, which confirms that these currencies are considered riskier than the
euro. The same, in principle, holds for the Czech koruna, although there are two periods when
the risk of depreciation is perceived as higher than that of appreciation. The first one is a very735
short episode in the summer of 2008, abruptly ended by an outbreak of the global financial crisis.
The second one is longer as it lasted from September 2015 to March 2017. It overlapped with the
large-scale foreign exchange interventions carried out by the CNB to suppress the tendency of
its currency to appreciate in response to quantitative easing deployed by the ECB and continued
favourable developments in the domestic economy (see point 6.1 and Czech National Bank, 2017).740
The RR of the Czech currency increased in April 2017 when the exchange rate floor vis-à-vis
the euro was abandoned. Overall, in line with the intuition, CEE currencies can be considered
riskier than the euro.
To provide more insights on the estimated UIP coefficients, we proceed in four steps. First,
the baseline Fama regressions are re-estimated on the 2006-2019 sample. The β coefficients745
obtained for this sample are reported in Table 6 in column (1). Second, the variability of
6To pin down the degree of moneyness, the delta of an option equalled to +/-0.25 is used. The delta is a
derivative of the option price with respect to the spot price of a currency. For details see, e.g., Garman and
Kohlhagen (1983) and Farhi and Gabaix (2016).
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Figure 6: Risk reversals of CEE currencies vis-à-vis the euro
Notes: following the convention adopted in the Refinitiv Datastream, the RRs of CEE currencies are calculated as differences
in the implied volatility of 25-delta out-of-the money call options on the euro and the implied volatility of 25-delta out-of-the
money put options on the euro. Source: own calculations based on data from the Refinitiv Datastream.
inflation differential is calculated using the CPI inflation rates for CEE countries and the HICP
inflation rate for the euro area (data are from the International Financial Statistics database).
The results are reported in column (2). Third, the variability in the relative country resilience
is proxied with the variability of the RR.7 The results are tabulated in column (3). In Section750
3, it is explained that what matters for the deviation of the β coefficient from the level implied
by the UIP is the importance of variability in inflation differential relative to variability in the
relative country resilience. Thus, in the fourth step, the ratio of these variabilities is calculated.
It is reported in column (4). For ease of interpretation, the weight on the coefficient implied by
the UIP is also tabulated in column (5). This measure conveys the same information as the ratio755
of variabilities in column (4) but is easier to apply to the UIP puzzle analysis.












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample A: February 2006 – December 2019
Czechia 0.773 0.006 1.257 0.716 0.165
Hungary 1.360 0.024 2.307 1.517 0.295
Poland 0.045 0.011 1.857 0.829 0.186
Sample B: January 2010 – December 2019
Czechia 9.461 0.003 0.761 0.641 0.150
Hungary 1.173 0.013 0.881 2.058 0.361
Poland 1.472 0.007 0.553 1.700 0.319
Notes: implied weight, 1−ν, is implicitly defined in Equation (15). See the main text for further explanations.
The observed association between the estimated β coefficient and the ratio of variabilities
7In the calibrated model of Farhi and Gabaix (2016), the latter is a multiple of the former and the scaling
constant is 1.572.
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is only roughly in line with the negative association implied by the model. The same holds for
the association between the β coefficient and the weight on the coefficient implied by the UIP.
It is because both the coefficient in the regression for the Hungarian forint and the weight are760
largest. When read without taking into account the results for Hungary, the findings for the
other two currencies are in line with the RDH: the estimated coefficient for Czechia deviates
from the zero-level implied by the UIP more than the coefficient for Poland (0.773 vs 0.045),
and at the same time the weight of the coefficient implied by the UIP relationship is smaller in
Czechia than in Poland (0.165 vs 0.186).765
One can make a fair point that the differences between CEE countries are not sharp since the
estimated β is not statistically significant for any country. Following this concern, we repeated
the whole exercise on the sample starting in January 2010. The results are reported in Table 6 in
the panel entitled Sample B. The β coefficient is found to be statistically significant for Czechia
but not for the other two countries, which makes the comparative analysis more justified.8 In770
line with the RDH, the weight of the coefficient implied by the UIP is smaller in Czechia (0.150)
than in the other two CEE economies (above 0.300).
Our findings, although preliminary, demonstrate the importance of currency resilience to rare
disasters in driving the deviations from the UIP relationship. As such, they are consistent with
the evidence that the returns on currencies perceived as risky are determined by rare disaster775
risks documented for the dollar-based exchange rates of the BRICS countries by Gupta et al.
(2019). Moreover, the results fit the conjecture put forward by Ismailov and Rossi (2018) that
the relationship between exchange rates and interest rate differentials are blurred in periods of
high uncertainty that can be potentially linked to rare disasters.
To sum up, even though our findings lend some support to the relevance of the RDH to780
the CEE currencies, they should be interpreted with caution. Taking into account that the
time series employed are not too long, we consider the results as tentative and requiring further
research.
7 Conclusions
This paper aimed to examine the evidence on the UIP puzzle in four CEE economies: Czechia,785
Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Starting with baseline Fama regressions, we investigated the
forward premium anomaly for the U.S. dollar, the euro, and the Swiss franc, covering the period
from 1999 to 2019. After checking for structural breaks in baseline regressions and providing
the error decomposition of deviations from the UIP, we put forward a sequence of UIP models
augmented with various risk measures. We also offered several extensions to the common UIP790
test. We considered the impact of exchange rate interventions in Czechia and market expectations
in Poland on the interest rate parities. We also investigated the role of the FX implied volatility
measures in explaining the ‘riskiness’ of CEE currencies with the rare disasters hypothesis.
8The samples starting in 2007, 2008, and 2009 were also tried. The coefficients were insignificant in the first two
samples. In the third sample, the coefficient was significant for Czechia and Hungary and insignificant for Poland.
At the same time, however, the coefficients for Hungary and Poland were very close to each other. The difference
in their statistical significance was due to the precision of estimation rather than economic considerations. Thus,
these results are not reported, albeit they are available upon request.
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We first show that the choice of the reference currency matters for the outcome of the interest
parity tests in the CEE economies, and the puzzle prevails for the EUR and the CHF but not795
for the USD. This regularity has not been documented in previous studies. Second, we find that
the structural breaks in the time series used to test the UIP are not an essential reason for the
general failure of the parity in the region. Third, we demonstrate that even though the risk-
based measures essentially improve the baseline testing regression, they do not alter the overall
conclusions on the puzzle’s existence (or lack thereof). Additionally, we show that the Czech800
koruna exchange rate peg to the euro from 2013 to 2017 and related FX market interventions
had a significant impact on the UIP. A case study on Poland confirms that forecast and risk
premium errors play leading roles in UIP deviations, while the directly measured exchange rate
expectations do not seem to be informed by the UIP relationship. Option-implied risk reversals
for the CEE currencies and the euro indicate that crash risks are priced into their exchange805
rates. Hence, the limited resilience of CEE economies to world disasters may plausibly explain
departures from the UIP that we observe for their currencies.
Some limitations of this study should be acknowledged. A major one comes from the avail-
ability of the datasets we use to investigate forward rates, market expectations, FX options,
and risk reversals. Moreover, even though it is known that the choice of the base currency can810
affect the evidence on the UIP hypothesis (see, e.g., Chinn and Quayyum, 2012), the differences
between the results for the relations involving the dollar and euro exchange rates remain puz-
zling and call for further explanation. Finally, given that the exchange rate can be a part of
a policy reaction function, the proper treatment of potential endogeneity could require using a
fully-fledged economic model.815
Promising areas for an extension of this study include an investigation into a possibly asym-
metric relationship between interest rates and risk premium, including higher conditional mo-
ments of exchange rate returns, currency crashes (Brunnermeier et al., 2008), and rare disasters
(Gupta et al., 2019). Given the role of the global risk fluctuations for CEE economies, searching
for a triangulation of the euro-dollar exchange rate, international risk factors (e.g., oil prices),820
and the CEE exchange rates posits an interesting alternative to a single exchange rate framework
(Kȩbłowski et al., 2020). Empirical puzzles related to the UIP anomaly, such as the one that
connects deviations from UIP to levels of exchange rates (Engel, 2016), are also worth exploring
for currencies other than the U.S. dollar.
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